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Abstract. The manuscript advances a hypothesis that there are few fundamental principles of 
neural organization of cognition, which explain several wide areas of the cognitive functioning. 
We summarize the fundamental principles, experimental, theoretical, and modeling evidence for 
these principles, relate them to hypothetical neural mechanisms, and made a number of 
predictions. We consider cognitive functioning including concepts, emotions, drives-instincts, 
learning, “higher” cognitive functions of language, interaction of language and cognition, role of 
emotions in this interaction, the beautiful, sublime, and music. Among mechanisms of behavior 
we concentrate on internal actions in the brain, learning and decision making. A number of 
predictions are made, some of which have been previously formulated and experimentally 
confirmed, a number of new predictions are made that can be experimentally tested. Is it possible 
to explain a significant part of workings of the mind from few basic principles, similar to how 
Newton explained motions of planets? This manuscript summarizes a part of contemporary 
knowledge toward this goal. 
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1. Hypothetical fundamental principles and abilities. 
 
Instinctual drives  
Instinctual drives are ancient biological mechanisms. For the purpose of understanding of human 
cognitive functioning, a significant part of these mechanisms can be modeled by Grossberg-
Levine theory of drives and emotions (1987). These authors have modeled an instinctual drive as 
an internal sensory-like neural mechanism measuring vital bodily parameters. When these 
parameters are outside safe bounds, the instinctual mechanism sends evaluative neural signals to 
decision-making parts of the brain. 
 
Emotions  
Emotions refer to many different mechanisms in the mind and body. According to (Grossberg & 
Levine, 1987) emotional signals evaluate concepts for the purpose of instinct satisfaction. 
Recognition of objects or situations that can potentially satisfy vital needs of the organism 
(instincts) receive preferential attention. A number of neural and physiological realizations of 
this mechanism have been identified (Gnadt & Grossberg, 2008). 
N
at
ur
e 
Pr
ec
ed
in
gs
 : 
hd
l:1
01
01
/n
pr
e.
20
12
.7
09
8.
1 
: P
os
te
d 
2 
Ap
r 2
01
2
 
Concepts  
Concepts and perceptions are cognitive mechanisms for understanding reality. Their neural 
mechanisms are mental representations (Grossberg, 1982, 1988; Kosslyn, 1980, 1994). Some 
aspects of representations, especially related to early visual perception of objects are retinotopic, 
other, especially related to abstract concepts are distributed in the brain (Barsalou, 1999). 
 
Top-down and bottom-up signals 
Signal streams from sensors to objects, to situations, to abstract concepts are called bottom-up 
(BU) signals, and signals in the opposite direction, from conceptual representations toward 
sensor input signals are called top-down (TD) signals. Representations at a higher level create 
more abstract concepts as collections of lower level ones.  Many neural pathways in the brain 
carry neural connections in reciprocal directions (Grossberg, 1988).  
 
Learning in interaction of TD and BU signal  
The fundamental mechanism of learning representations is an interaction between BU and TD. In 
interaction of the two nearby layers BU signals project to a higher level sensor signals, or signals 
from identified representations at a given layer. At the same time TD signals project expected 
representations from the higher layer down to the lower one. Modeling this interaction is 
fundamental for understanding learning mechanisms.   
 
Vague-to-Crisp process of learning  
Interaction of BU and TD signals proceeds from initial vague representations to crisp (or crisper) 
representations. This process from vague to crisp is hypothesized to be fundamental for many 
brain mechanisms, including cognition-language interaction. Mathematical model of this 
process, dynamic logic, has been developed for overcoming a fundamental difficulty of modeling 
the mind in artificial intelligence, complexity of computation (Perlovsky 1987, 2001, 2006a). 
This complexity is related to using logic for modeling the mind. Complexity of logical models of 
cognition and perception exceeds by far all interactions of all particles in the Universe during its 
entire lifetime. Bar et al (2006) demonstrated that a vague-to-crisp process is a valid model for 
visual perception, which proceeds as the process from vague to crisp. Starting with vague 
representations eliminates the need to consider combinations of objects and results in low 
computational complexity, corresponding to actual cognitive processes. 
 
Consciousness, unconscious, and logic 
Crisp-logical or nearly logical brain states are available to consciousness. Vague states and 
processes are not available to consciousness (Perlovsky, 2001, 2006; Bar et al, 2006). Because of 
this, consciousness and subjective intuition are biased towards logic. This bias affects scientists 
as well; therefore most scientific ideas and cognitive theories are biased toward logic and may 
lead to contradictions (Perlovsky, 2006, 2011a, 2012a). Representations at higher levels are built 
on top of several lower levels. Correspondingly they are vaguer and less conscious. 
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Knowledge instinct 
Understanding reality requires matching BU and TD signals. Without this match mental 
representations would not correspond to objects and situations. Therefore higher animals and 
humans are endowed with inborn unconscious drive to match BU and TD signals. This match is 
a measure of knowledge, therefore this instinctual drive is called the knowledge instinct, KI, 
(Perlovsky 2001, 2006). Hypothetical neural mechanisms of KI have been considered in (Levine 
& Perlovsky 2008, 2010). 
 
Aesthetic emotions 
According to drive and emotion theory (Grossberg & Levine, 1987) satisfaction of every 
instinct-drive is experienced emotionally. Satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) of KI is experienced as 
special emotions (Perlovsky, 2001, 2006; Perlovsky, Bonniot-Cabanac, & Cabanac, 2010); 
because they are related to knowledge, these emotions are called aesthetic emotions (Kant, 
1790). They are “higher” then emotions corresponding to bodily instinctual needs. At lower 
hierarchical levels they reach consciousness usually when KI is dissatisfied, as in horror movies. 
At higher levels positive aesthetic emotions could be conscious. It follows that cognition 
combines conceptual and emotional mechanisms. 
 
 
2. Cognitive abilities explained from fundamental principles 
 
Hierarchy 
The mind-brain is organized in an approximate hierarchy from sensory signals, to early 
processing mechanisms producing sensory “features,” to objects, contexts, scenes, situations, and 
higher up to representations of abstract concepts, and to even higher abstractions, which contents 
we consider later (Grossberg, 1982, 1988). Lower-levels of hierarchy, from sensor signals to 
objects exist in higher animals and are of genetic origin. Hierarchy above objects sets humans 
aside from animals; its emergence requires language and the process from vague to crisp, as 
discussed below.  
 
Language 
Language is a hierarchy parallel and similar to cognition. Driven by language instinct (LI), 
language is learned by about the age of five. This is possible because LI drives language 
representations to match surrounding language, but not the real life. Surrounding language 
contains words, phrases, grammar “ready made” throughout the entire hierarchy. This is a 
fundamental difference between language and cognition. Objects and concepts of cognition, 
especially higher in the hierarchy, do not exist “ready made” in the surrounding world. Therefore 
cognition takes a lifetime. Matching language representations to surrounding language involves 
BU and TD signal interaction and processes from vague to crisp discussed earlier (Perlovsky, 
2009a). 
 
Dual hierarchy of interacting language and cognition 
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The brain-mind contains two parallel hierarchies of cognitive and language representations 
(Perlovsky, 2004, 2009a, 2010e). In the inborn mind, both types of representations are vague 
placeholders for future contents, but neural connections between representations are inborn. Both 
representations are becoming crisp in the process from vague to crisp discussed earlier. By about 
age of five, language representations are crisp, conscious, and correspond to surrounding 
language. Most of cognitive representations are vague and unconscious. Throughout the rest of 
life, cognitive representations acquire more concrete contents in correspondence with one’s 
experience and contents of language representations, neurally connected to each cognitive 
representation. This explains first, how the hierarchy of cognitive representations can be learned 
on top of vaguer and vaguer representations, language serves as a scaffold. Second, this explains 
how every child manages to connect words and objects correctly among virtual infinity of 
incorrect associations. Third, it explains why children can clearly and logically talk about almost 
everything, but cannot act like adults: their cognitive representations (about the world) are vague 
and unconscious. Fourth, it gives a plausible hypothesis of language evolution: necessary neural 
wirings connecting the two types of representations have long been there due to the mirror 
neuron system (Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998; Arbib, 2005; Perlovsky, 2012d). 
 
Beautiful, sublime, and the meaning of life 
Representations at higher levels of the hierarchy evolved to unify entire experience (partially in 
genetic evolution and partially in cultural evolution). They are felt as the meaning and purpose of 
life. Satisfaction of KI at these high levels is experienced as emotions of the beautiful. Aesthetic 
emotions at these high levels, when related to representations of behavior that could realize the 
purpose and meaning in ones life, are experienced as emotions of the sublime, a foundation of all 
religions (subjectively unconscious). Cognitive representations at these high levels of the mental 
hierarchy are mostly inaccessible to consciousness. The dual hierarchy explains why it is 
possible to talk crisply and logically about the meaning and purpose of life, the beautiful and 
sublime (because language representations are crisp and logical throughout the entire hierarchy), 
whereas it is not possible to achieve final and logical understanding of the meaning of life or 
formulate rules of the beautiful (Perlovsky, 2000, 2001, 2001, 2006a, 2010b,f,g). When one feels 
logical and conscious understanding of these issues, this understanding is similar to children’s 
understanding: language representations are crisp and conscious, but cognitive representations 
are vague and unconscious. 
 
Language evolution 
Conceptual and emotional contents in animal’s vocalizations are inseparable. Also, vocalizations 
in animals are inseparable from conceptual-emotional-behavioral mental states. Vocal chords are 
controlled from ancient involuntary emotional centers in limbic system. Evolution of language 
required freeing vocalizations from uncontrollable emotional encumbrances. This required 
rewiring of the brain and evolution of emotional centers in cortex, partially under volitional 
control, which could consciously control vocalization (Deacon, 1989; Lieberman, 2000; Mithen, 
2007, Botha, 2003; Botha & Knight 2009). 
 
Language emotionality 
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Emotionality of all human languages is significantly reduced as compared to animal 
vocalizations. All humans have significant control over emotionality of vocalizations. Still some 
degree of emotionality is necessary to motivate connecting language representations to cognitive 
representations (Perlovsky, 2007a, 2009b, 2010a,e, 2012b,e).  
 
Language and culture. Emotional Sapir-Whorf hypothesis 
Efficient dual hierarchy of language and cognition requires “appropriate” emotionality of human 
voice (Perlovsky 2007a). Low emotionality helps fast evolution of conceptual knowledge, but 
threatens connection between knowledge and values. Psychological well-being is not 
automatically guaranteed. The entire culture might lose its meaning and purpose. High 
emotionality makes conceptual knowledge highly valuable and difficult to modify. Individual 
psychological well-being is “automatic,” but conceptual knowledge evolves slowly, culture 
stagnates. Language emotionality has been connected to language grammar (Perlovsky 2009b, 
2011b, 2012b). 
 
Cognitive dissonance 
Language helps evolving diverse knowledge. This has to lead to multiple cognitive dissonances 
(CD), contradictions in knowledge. CD are difficult to tolerate and human tend to dismiss 
contradictory knowledge (devalue contradictory knowledge, often irrationally). The 2002 Nobel 
Prize in economics (Kahneman) has been awarded to significant extent for recognition that CD 
may cause irrational decisions (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).   
 
Music 
CD during emergence of language would cause devaluing contradictory knowledge. Every 
knowledge contradicts, to some extent, inborn drives and other knowledge (otherwise this new 
knowledge will not be needed). Therefore CD during emergence of language would devalue 
knowledge, language, cognition, evolution of consciousness. Human cultural evolution required 
a powerful mechanism for resolving CD. In animals, conceptual and emotional parts of 
vocalization are fused, and CD does not appear in natural states. Therefore, evolution of 
language toward less emotionality of vocalization had to be accompanied by evolution of 
emotional part of vocalization toward enhanced emotionality, helping mitigate CD. Many 
evolutionary scientists assumed that initially language and music have been fused. Eventually 
emotionality of voice evolved into music. This is the cognitive function of music, the reason for 
its evolution, which has been considered mysterious by Aristotle, Kant, Darwin, and by 
contemporary evolutionary psychologists and musicologists (see reviews in Perlovsky, 2006c, 
2008, 2010a, 2012c,e,f). 
 
 
3. Experimental, theoretical, and model arguments 
 
TD and BU signals, vague-to-crisp process, dynamic logic, consciousness, and unconscious 
Since the 1950s artificial intelligence attempted to model cognitive processes of perception. The 
encountered difficulties have been related to combinatorial complexity (CC) of computations 
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(Perlovsky, 1997, 1998). These were related to Gödelian limitations of logic; they were 
manifestations of logic inconsistency in finite systems (Perlovsky 2001). To overcome 
limitations of logic, dynamic logic was proposed (Perlovsky 1991, 2001, 2006a). Whereas logic 
works with statements (e.g. “this is a chair”), dynamic logic is a process from vague to crisp, 
from a vague statement, decision, plan, to crisp ones. A large number of engineering problems 
have been solved with dynamic logic, which remained unsolved for decades (Perlovsky 1987; 
Perlovsky, Deming, & Ilin, 2011 and refs therein).  
 Consider a seemingly simple experiment. Close your eyes and imagine an object in front 
of you. The imagined image is vague, not as crisp and clear as with opened eyes. As we open our 
eyes; the object becomes crisp and clear. It seems to occur momentarily, but actually it takes 
1/5th of a second. This is a very long time for neural brain mechanisms – hundreds of thousands 
of neural interactions. Let us also note: with opened eyes we are not conscious about the initially 
vague imagination, we are not conscious of the entire 1/5th of a second, we are conscious only 
about the end of this process: a crisp, clear object in front of our eyes. The explanation of this 
experiment has become simple after many years of research that have uncovered what goes on in 
the brain during these 1/5th of a second. 
 Dynamic logic corresponds to the open-close eye experiment: initial states of the models 
are vague. This experiment was performed measuring many details using brain imaging. M. Bar, 
K. S. Kassam, A .S. Ghuman, J. Boshyan, A. M. Schmid, A. M. Dale, M. S. Hamalainen, K. 
Marinkovic, D. L. Schacter, B. R. Rosen, and E. Halgren (2006) used functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging (fMRI) to obtain high-spatial resolution of processes in the brain, which they 
combined with magneto-encephalography (MEG), measurements of the magnetic field next to 
head, which provided a high temporal resolution of the brain activity. Combining these two 
techniques the experimenters were able to measure high resolution of cognitive processes in 
space and time. Bar et al concentrated on three brain areas: early visual cortex, object recognition 
area (fusiform gyrus), and object-information semantic processing area (OFC). They 
demonstrated that OFC is activated 130 ms after the visual cortex, but 50 ms before object 
recognition area. This suggests that OFC represents the cortical source of top-down facilitation in 
visual object recognition. This top-down facilitation was unconscious. In addition they 
demonstrated that the imagined perception generated by the top-down signals facilitated from 
OFC to the cortex is vague, similar to the close-open-eye experiment. Conscious perception of an 
object occurs when vague projections become crisp and match a crisp image from the retina, 
following that an object recognition area is activated. 
The opened-closed eye experiment confirmes that crisp-logical or nearly logical brain 
states are available to consciousness. Vague states and processes are not available to 
consciousness (Perlovsky, 2001, 2006; Bar et al, 2006). Because of this, consciousness and 
subjective intuition are biased towards logic. This bias affects scientists as well; therefore most 
scientific ideas and cognitive theories are biased toward logic and may lead to contradictions 
(Perlovsky, 2006, 2011a, 2012a). 
 
Knowledge instinct and aesthetic emotions 
Hypothetical neural mechanisms of KI have been considered in (Levine & Perlovsky 2008, 
2010). Satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) of KI is experienced as aesthetic emotions (Perlovsky, 
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2001, 2006a). Existence of these emotions have been experimentally demonstrated in (Perlovsky, 
Bonniot-Cabanac, & Cabanac, 2010). 
 
Dual hierarchy of interacting language and cognition 
Initial experimental indication for the dual model has appeared in (Franklin, A., Drivonikou, G. 
V., Bevis, L., Davie, I. R. L., Kay, P. & Regier, T. 2008). They have demonstrated that the 
categorical perception of color in prelinguistic infants is based in the right brain hemisphere. As 
language is acquired and access to lexical color codes becomes more automatic, categorical 
perception of color moves to the left hemisphere (between two and five years) and adult’s 
categorical perception of color is only based in the left hemisphere. These experiments have 
provided evidence for neural connections between perception and language, a foundation of the 
dual model. Possibly it confirms another aspect of the dual model: the crisp and conscious 
language part of the model hides from our consciousness the vaguer cognitive part of the model. 
This is similar to what we observed in the close-open eye experiment: with opened eyes we are 
not conscious about vague imaginations-priming signals. 
 
Language emotionality and cultural evolutions. Emotional Sapir-Whorf hypothesis 
Different emotionalities of different languages have been experimentally demonstrated in 
(Guttfreund, 1990; Harris, Ayçiçegi, & Gleason, 2003). In particular, experimental results of 
(Guttfreund, 1990) suggest that emotionality is a property of languages, not effects of cultures on 
languages. Different cultural historical paths influenced by languages have been considered in 
(Perlovsky, 2007a, 2009b). 
 
Music reduces cognitive dissonance 
In Masataka and Perlovsky (2012) it has been experimentally demonstrated that music reduces 
cognitive dissonance. This publication repeated a classical experiment known to induce CD and 
the corresponding devaluation of the contradictory objects. When the same experiment has been 
repeated with music, devaluation did not occur. The music used in this experiment is known to 
lead to mental excitation, not relaxation. It is concluded that CD actually occurred, and music 
helped to keep contradictory knowledge, rather than discarding it. 
 
 
4. Experimentally testable predictions 
 
Vague-to-Crisp process in the hierarchy; consciousness and unconscious 
Vague-to-crisp process of learning is predicted as fundamental by dynamic logic. Consciousness 
of crisp states and unconsciousness of the process from vague to crisp is predicted. These 
predictions have to be experimentally demonstrated higher up in the hierarchy, in interaction 
between cognition and language and in every learning process. 
 
Aesthetic emotions 
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Aesthetic emotions have been experimentally demonstrated in (Perlovsky, Bonniot-Cabanac, & 
Cabanac, 2010). These initial demonstrations have to be repeated in various settings. Satisfaction 
of KI has to be experimentally related to the meaning of life, beautiful and sublime emotions. 
 
Dual hierarchy of interacting language and cognition 
Experimental demonstrations are needed to prove that language and cognition interact as 
predicted by the dual model. Neural connections between language and cognitive representations 
should be demonstrated. Another prediction of the dual model is that when talking (discussing, 
reading) about abstract and less known concepts, cognitive representations are less excited than 
when discussing everyday well-known topics. This effect in adults should be compared to the 
one in children.  
 
Beautiful, sublime, and the meaning of life 
Is it possible to demonstrate language rather then cognitive understanding of representations at 
the top of the mental hierarchy? 
 
Language emotionality 
Initial research on emotionalities of various languages demonstrated in (Guttfreund, 1990; 
Harris, Ayçiçegi, & Gleason, 2003) should be continued. Complex relations between conceptual 
and emotional contents of various languages should be experimentally explored. Language 
emotionality and grammar should be correlated (Perlovsky 2009b, 2011b, 2012b). 
 
Language and culture. Emotional Sapir-Whorf hypothesis 
Language emotionalities, grammars, and cultural evolutionary paths should be empirically 
studied (Perlovsky 2009b, 2011b, 2012b). Some correlations are obvious, but scientific data are 
very limited. 
 
Cognitive dissonances  
Although CD is a well studied field, still more remains to be done. Emotions of CD should be 
“instrumentalized.” Only few basic emotions, which can be named by emotional words, have 
been studied and the number of independent emotions has been identified (few). Basic emotions 
are similar for humans and animals. The real wealth of human emotions has not even been 
discussed. Existence of CD emotions should be demonstrated. The number of CD emotions 
(likely very large) should be demonstrated (Perlovsky, 2006c, 2008, 2010a, 2012c,e,f). 
 
Music 
The initial results on music ability to help mitigating cognitive dissonances (Masataka & 
Perlovsky 2012) should be continued. A number of predictions about music (Perlovsky, 2006c, 
2008, 2010a, 2012c,e,f) is a vast field for experimental studies. These include: the number of 
musical emotions (very large, practically infinite); relations between emotions in music and CD, 
which music helps reducing which CD; relations between emotionality of languages and musical 
emotions in various cultures; is a large number of pop-songs in English a cultural compensation 
for low emotionality of English language? 
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